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The Personal Income Tax as a




This Article evaluates the pros and cons of a state individual
income tax from the perspective of an economist. The Article ex-
amines the income tax as one component of a tax structure that is
best suited for raising a given level of revenues. The important as-
sumption in the analysis is that the level of state public expendi-
tures is determined by residents' demand for public services. This
assumption does not preclude the tax structure from allowing
greater or lesser expenditures than are demanded during any single
year; rather, the assumption is that over time tax levels provide
revenues that are in accord with consumer preferences for public
services.
There are two basic implications to this assumption. First, it is
unnecessary to consider how the revenues will be spent to deter-
mine whether an income tax is a desirable revenue generator. Sec-
ond, based on this assumption, an income tax (or any tax) is most
effectively evaluated relative to another tax because the existence
of an income tax will result in either a direct replacement of or a
decrease in another tax. All taxes are politically and economically
disadvantageous when analyzed by themselves, so each tax is best
judged relative to other taxes. At the state level, the income tax is
best evaluated relative to the sales tax. Thus, the analysis below is
frequently a comparison between the characteristics of an income
and a sales tax. There are other taxes that could be compared with
the income tax, but these levies generally would be limited revenue
generators in comparison to sales and income taxes.
Part II of this Article is a brief overview of the current prac-
tice in state income taxation. Part III considers the pros and cons
* Associate Professor of Economics, Center for Business and Economic Research, The
University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
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of using an income tax as a revenue generator, including analysis of
the tax's potential as a revenue generator, the economic effects of
the tax, the equity implications raised by the tax, and the adminis-
trative concerns in using the tax. Part IV draws together these pros
and cons to reach a conclusion.
II. INCOME TAX SUMMARY
Income taxes are the second largest source of state tax reve-
nues, generating 30.0 percent of tax revenues in 1984.1 Only the
sales tax, which is responsible for 31.8 percent of revenues, contrib-
utes more.2 Both taxes provided a greater share of revenues in 1984
than a decade earlier in 1974, but the income tax share has risen
dramatically from the 23.0 percent share it provided in 1974.3 In-
come tax revenues grow faster relative to economic conditions than
most other state taxes, and this faster growth is likely to be the
most important reason for the increase in its revenue contribution.
The rapid growth means that the increase in the tax's share of rev-
enues is likely to be widespread across those states that use an in-
come tax, as opposed to being isolated in states that enacted rate
increases. Professors Bowman and Mikesell reported that between
1971 and 1980 twenty-two states significantly increased the per-
centage of their revenues raised by an income tax.4 On the other
hand, Mikesell recently concluded that growth in the percentage of
total taxes contributed by the sales tax is mostly the result of
greater use of the tax by a small number of states. 5
These statistics are useful for understanding average behavior,
but they fail to reflect the diversity that exists across states. Forty-
two states have income taxes, including Tennessee and New
Hampshire, which tax only interest and dividend income.6 Twenty
states raise between 25 percent and 35 percent of their revenues
1. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1984, Se-
ries GF84, No. 3, at 1 (1985).
2. Id.
3. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCE IN 1974, Series
GF74, No. 3, at 7 (1974).
4. Bowman & Mikesell, State-Local Tax Structure Changes, 1971-1980, 1981 PROC. OF
THE SEVENTY-FOURTH ANN. CONF. OF TAX'N 202, 204.
5. Paper presented by John Mikesell at the Seventy-Eighth Annual Conference of
Taxation, National Tax Association: Tax Institute of America (1985), to be published in
1985 PROC. OF THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH ANN. CONF. OF TAX'N.
6. [1985] 46 ST. TAX REV. (CCH) No. 51, at 4. Connecticut, which is not included in
the 42, also has a tax on interest and dividend income for taxpayers with more than $50,000
in federal adjusted gross income. Id. at 9.
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from the income tax, but at the extremes, some generate zero reve-
nue and Oregon receives 65.8 percent of tax revenues from an in-
come tax.7
Most states use progressive tax rates: thirty-three have their
own progressive tax structure, and three levy the state tax as a
precentage of the federal tax liability, thereby accepting federal
progressivity. The income level at which the highest marginal tax
rate is reached often is low; thus, for many taxpayers, the tax may
appear essentially proportional. Six states, including Tennessee
and New Hampshire, have flat rate income taxes.9 Minnesota has
the highest marginal tax rate at 14.0 percent. 10
Every state with an income tax, except for Tennessee and New
Hampshire, allows withholding." Fifteen states permit federal tax
payments to be deductible in some form.' 2 Forty of the forty-two
states permit residents a credit for taxes paid in other states, but
in some cases this credit is only given if reciprocity agreements
exist."
III. THE PROS AND CONS OF AN INCOME TAX
This section addresses four main issues: the ability of the in-
come tax to provide revenues, the equity implications of an income
tax, the administrative and compliance implications of the tax, and
the effects of an income tax on efficiently operating economic mar-
kets. This list of issues is not unique to the author, but is a stan-
dard set used by public finance economists for studying tax struc-
tures. The emphasis on topics within the list, however, may differ
from what others would consider appropriate. The resulting con-
clusions provide mixed support for the income tax vis-a-vis a sales
tax. To reach a conclusion about the degree to which a state in-
come tax is an appropriate way to generate revenue for any partic-
ular state requires balancing the positive and negative aspects of
the tax.
7. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1984, Se-
ries GF84, No. 3, at 10-11 (1985).
8. [1985] 46 ST. TAX REV. (CCH), No. 51, at 8-19.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 14. Oklahoma has a 17.0% rate for people who choose to deduct their federal
income tax when calculating their Oklahoma liability. Id. at 17.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 5.
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A. Contribution of an Income Tax to Revenue Needs
The assumption made at the Article's beginning implies that
expenditure levels determine revenue needs for a state. Analysis of
the tax structure's ability to provide for revenue needs can be di-
vided into consideration of the tax's stability and the tax's ade-
quacy. Revenue stability refers to the ability of the tax structure to
provide sufficient revenues during each part of a business cycle.
This concept differs from revenue adequacy, which is the ability of
the tax structure to allow enough revenue growth to provide suffi-
cient revenues over the long term. A revenue structure can be ade-
quate in the sense that sufficient revenues are provided on average
over a number of years and yet be unstable in that the revenue
flow varies widely from year to year. The reverse also could be
true. Unstable tax structures create the revenue shortfalls that
cause deficits and impoundments during economic recessions. In-
adequate revenues generate the need to raise tax rates because of
an inability to finance desired services.
1. Revenue Adequacy
Consider first the role that an income tax can play in achiev-
ing revenue adequacy. Given the assumption that demand for ser-
vices sets long-term expenditure patterns, it follows that an ade-
quate tax structure is one in which the income elasticity of
revenues (revenue elasticity) is equal to the income elasticity of
expenditures (expenditure elasticity). When these two elasticities
are equal, states can maintain service levels without increasing tax
rates. Some evidence on expenditure elasticities is available and
would suggest that the elasticity for many services is likely to be in
the range of one, or perhaps a little less.14 Thus, the revenue elas-
ticity over a large number of years should also be approaching one
if the structure is to be adequate. Expenditure elasticities differ by
state; so some difference in tax structure is appropriate.
The income elasticity of state income taxes (revenue elasticity)
appears to be relatively high. McHugh estimates that the inflation
elasticity (the elasticity from a nominal, but not real, increase in
income) ranged from 1.6 to 2.2 for the six states he examined. 5 He
14. See Inman, The Fiscal Performance of Local Governments: An Interpretive Re-
view, in CURRENT ISSUES IN URBAN ECONOMICS 270 (1979) (reviewing local government ex-
penditure elasticities).
15. McHugh, Income Tax Indexation in the States: A Quantitative Appraisal of Par-
tial Indexation, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 193, 197 (1981).
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indicated that indexing the taxes for inflation would allow revenue
elasticities in most of the six states to be in the range of one. 6 In
practice, however, indexing is not used in all states. Inman esti-
mates that the revenue elasticity for local government income tax-
ation is 1.2.17 Both Wasylenko and Greytak and Thursby found the
New York income tax to have an elasticity of approximately 1.3.18
A reasonable conclusion is that in most cases a state using an in-
come tax to generate all of its revenues would have a revenue elas-
ticity that would exceed the expenditure elasticity.
Sales taxes are likely to have much lower revenue elasticities. 19
Fox and Campbell found the long-term elasticity of the sales tax in
Tennessee to be 0.59.20 The elasticity for many of the selective
sales taxes, such as those on cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, are
likely to be even lower. Thus, a state that relies on consumption
taxes to generate most of its revenue is likely to have an inade-
quate tax structure. In Tennessee, which generates about seventy-
five percent of its revenues from consumption taxes and only two
percent from an income tax, the legislature has been forced to en-
act five major tax rate increases (corporate and sales taxes) since
1971 to keep state tax revenues nearly constant as a percent of
personal income. Kentucky, which uses a more balanced tax struc-
ture, has had no major rate increases during the same time period.
The discussion of tax adequacy indicates that a tax structure
based substantially on either income or consumption is likely to be
inadequate unless the demand for public services is either highly
elastic or highly inelastic (the expenditure elasticity is either very
high or very low). The income-tax-dominated state could generate
too much revenue, prompting efforts to reduce rates, as occurred
through Propositions 13 and 4 in California during the 1970s. The
consumption-tax-dominated state could generate too little revenue,
requiring frequent rate increases as in the Tennessee experience.
The income tax elasticity will depend on the characteristics of the tax's structure, such
as the degree of progressiveness and the size of the personal exemptions.
16. Id.
17. Inman, supra note 14, at 290.
18. Greytak & Thursby, Functional Form in State Income Tax Elasticity Estimation,
32 NAT'L TAX J. 195, 197 (1979); Wasylenko, Estimating the Elasticity of State Personal
Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 139, 142 (1975).
19. The income and sales tax bases are probably similar in size for many states be-
cause many business purchases are taxed under state sales taxes. The different revenue elas-
ticities mean that the income base will become increasingly larger.
20. Fox & Campbell, Stability of the State Sales Tax Income Elasticity, 37 NAT'L
TAX J. 201, 207 (1984).
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Only a state that balances its tax structure with both consumption
and income taxes is likely to achieve an adequate tax structure.
This balance permits states to keep services at desired levels with-
out the politically difficult actions associated with frequent tax
rate changes. A state with somewhat higher tastes for government
services may need to rely more on an income tax, and a state with
somewhat lower demands may need to rely more on a sales tax, but
significant use of both taxes will be necessary in most states. 21 A
state that can tax particularly unique resources, such as oil (in past
years) or tourism, provides an exception to this finding. These few
states may not need the balanced tax structure to achieve
adequacy.
2. Revenue Stability
Revenue stability is the other issue to be considered when
evaluating the role that an income tax would play in providing for
revenue needs. The tax elasticity described above represents the
"relationship between revenue growth and income growth over a
number of years. In practice, however, the elasticity varies across
business cycles, and this variation is the important issue for exam-
ining the tax's stability. A stable tax can be defined as one in
which the short-term (year-to-year) elasticity varies in a
countercyclical manner. Stability is thus defined in terms of the
dynamics of revenue growth rather than in a static sense, which
would define stability as the collection of a constant amount of
revenue. The definition means that the elasticity would rise in a
recession and fall in an expansion and the changing elasticity
would have the effect of reducing the swings in revenue growth
rates across business cycles. A truly stable tax by this definition
probably does not exist, yet the concept is most useful in a com-
parative sense.
Little study has been done on the stability of the income tax,
but an income tax that had a proportional tax rate and taxed all
sources of income would have an elasticity exactly equal to one at
all points across the business cycle. Progressive tax rates, large per-
sonal exemptions, and significant exclusions from taxable income
would make the tax elasticity vary in a procyclical fashion. That is,
the elasticity probably rises in expansions and falls in recessions,
21. More rapid revenue growth for income taxes means that stdtes will become more




the inverse of revenue stability. Overall, however, an income tax
would not appear to be as unstable as a sales tax unless it were
very progressive with large personal exemptions. In a study of Ten-
nessee's sales tax, Fox and Campbell demonstrated that the sales
tax is highly unstable: between 1975 and 1982 it had short-term
income elasticities as low as 0.16 and as high as 0.92.12 The highest
elasticities were found to occur in expansion years and the lowest
during recession years."3 The instability arises because of differ-
ences in the items that are purchased across the business cycle. It
should be noted that sales taxes with very broad bases will be the
least unstable; attempts to improve sales tax equity by eliminating
food from the base, therefore, have the effect of making the sales
tax more unstable. The instability and inadequacy of sales taxes
compound at the end of a recession. Sales tax revenue growth dur-
ing a recession generally has been very slow, and the elasticities
coming into an expansion are too low to offset the effects of the
recession.
In conclusion, a more stable tax structure can be achieved
with greater use of an income tax. This conclusion is not accepted
by all students of public finance and, in fact, runs counter to the
current conventional wisdom.2' Even if the income tax were unsta-
ble, the high elasticities in an expansion generally are sufficient to
overcome the slow revenue growth that occurs during a recession.
With a sales tax, the elasticities in an expansion are not high
enough to overcome the weak revenue growth in a recession.
B. Economic Effects of an Income Tax
This section examines three types of economic effects of taxes:
first, the distortions in behavior that arise when taxes affect the
decisions that people make; second, the effects that taxes have
along the border of a state; and third, the effects that taxes have
on employment growth.
1. Tax Effects on Decisions
Every tax that state governments impose will create some dis-
tortions in behavior by influencing some individuals to change
their decisions. Income taxes will distort the choice between earn-
22. Fx & Campbell, supra note 20, at 209.
23. Id. at 208-09. The effects of other factors, like changes in the inflation rate, are
held constant in the Fox and Campbell analysis.
24. See C. PENNIMAN, STATE INCOME TAXATION 11 (1980).
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ing income and taking leisure because only labor is taxed. Income
taxes also distort the choice between present and future consump-
tion because the return earned by deferring consumption (interest)
is taxed. A consumption tax (general sales) also will distort the
choice between earning income and taking leisure because the
spending of income will be taxed, but leisure will not. Further-
more, a general consumption tax will distort the choice of what
goods are consumed because even a general sales tax fails to tax all
consumption.
These distortions are well known to economists. One frequent
use of this information is to design the tax structure to encourage a
particular public policy objective by taxing in a way that encour-
ages desirable behavior or discourages undesirable behavior. State
economies, however, are very open, meaning it may be difficult for
states to achieve significant policy objectives through choice of a
tax structure. Furthermore, state government taxes often will cre-
ate smaller incentives for behavior than federal taxes. The ability
to create incentives is particularly limited in the case of the income
tax simply because the state's tax structures are lower. Thus, the
use of tax structures to promote policy objectives probably is bet-
ter achieved at the federal level. Despite this drawback, Penniman
notes that all states have used the income tax to achieve various
social purposes.2 5 Nevertheless, at the state level the best approach
is to be aware of the distorting effects of tax alternatives and to
choose the alternatives that create the smallest distortions. These
distortions should be minimized because well-being is always re-
duced when taxes change behavior. Again, this argument implies
that a balanced tax structure is most suitable for state govern-
ments because it would keep the tax rates low and, therefore, the
distortionary effects for each tax at a minimum.
2. Border Effects
One set of economic effects that arise because of different
state tax structures, but that is much less important at the federal
level, is the border tax effects. These occur along state borders be-
cause of differences in the tax structure across state lines. Exam-
ples of border effects are when lower taxes on tobacco or alcohol
products or lower general sales tax rates induce people to cross
state lines to make purchases. Avoidance of taxes through these
mechanisms may be illegal, but enforcement is very difficult. An-
25. Id. at 65.
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other example is when professionals choose to live and operate
their businesses in a state without an income tax and still serve
clients from across the state's borders. This strategy permits the
professionals to avoid paying the state income tax.
A recent study examined the importance of these border ef-
fects for sales taxes s.2 The study concluded that in two Tennessee
metropolitan areas one percent of sales was lost for every one per-
cent increase in the state sales tax rate.27 In the Clarksville-Hop-
kinsville metropolitan area, where the tax differentials are the
greatest, the loss estimate was nearly four percent for every one
percent increase in the sales tax rate.2 8 Tennessee does not have a
general income tax and imposes much higher sales tax rates (state
and local rates combined) than most of its neighbors; so the border
effects can be large. Tennessee also has higher selective sales tax
rates than many of its neighbors.
Border tax effects will arise along state borders, and these ef-
fects cannot be easily eliminated by administrative means (en-
forcement, for example). Naturally, each state maintains the pre-
rogative to tax by the means it deems appropriate, but undesirable
border effects can be created by that choice. The best way for a
state to minimize border effects is to make its tax structure similar
to its neighbors', both in terms of the tax sources used and the
rates that are levied.
3. Employment Effects
The final issue for economic effects is how taxes influence em-
ployment growth in a state. The influence of a tax on employment
is not a completely separate issue from the border effects, but the
focus here is on the entire state rather than the narrow area along
the border. A recent study by Wasylenko and McGuire provided
some limited information suggesting that high income taxes can
discourage employment growth in the wholesale and retail trade
and finance industries.29 In particular, their research indicates that
high tax rates for the highest income (over fifty thousand dollars)
26. W. Fox, D. Ploch, P. Price & S. Bott, The Effect of Differential Tax Rates on
Consumption Behavior and Government Revenues (June 1985) (copies may be obtained
from the Center for Business and Economic Research, The University of Tennessee,
Knoxville).
27. Id. at 28.
28. Id. at 15.
29. See Wasylenko & McGuire, Jobs and Taxes: The Effect of Business Climate on
States' Employment Growth Rates, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 497 (1985).
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residents can discourage employment in these industries.3 0 The au-
thors also suggest that the sales tax rate can discourage wholesale
trade employment.31 On the other hand, the findings reveal that
the expenditure of tax revenues on education can increase employ-
ment.3 2 Overall, there is very little evidence to support an assertion
that a low rate income tax would cause greater employment losses
than the alternative tax that would be used. In fact, judicious ex-
penditure of the tax revenues could increase employment.
C. Equity Implications of an Income Tax
The income tax must be evaluated relative to two concepts of
equity-horizontal and vertical. Horizontal equity usually is inter-
preted to mean that people with the same taxpaying capacity
should pay the same taxes. Vertical equity means that people with
different taxpaying capacity should pay different taxes. The degree
to which these people should pay different taxes depends on one's
view of whether progressive, regressive, or proportional taxes are
desirable.
1. Horizontal Equity
As currently used, both sales and income taxes suffer from
horizontal equity problems. People with the same taxpaying capac-
ity (frequently measured by income) can pay very different income
taxes depending on how they earn their income. For example, in
some cases it is possible to earn interest from municipal, state, or
federal securities without paying taxes on the income. Earning in-
come through fringe benefits is another way to avoid income taxes.
The same holds true of sales taxes because people with the same
taxpaying capacity will pay different taxes depending on how they
spend their income. The most effective way to eliminate the hori-
zontal equity problem is to insure that the tax base is as broad as
possible. This principle is often violated when efforts are made to
exempt items from taxation to improve vertical equity.
2. Vertical Equity
Vertical equity can be defined by an economist, and taxes can
be categorized according to their vertical equity characteristics, but
a decision on which tax is preferable is a value judgment about
30. Id. at 505-08.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 506.
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whether progressive, regressive, or proportional taxation is desired.
None of these vertical equity concepts is inherently better. Income
taxes usually are structured as either proportional or progressive
depending on the choice of rates, use of personal exemptions, and
breadth of the tax base. Sales taxes are regressive in essentially
every case, although they become less regressive when food and
other "necessities" are excluded from the base.
The individual taxes should not be considered in a vacuum.
The choice of a sales tax, an income tax, or some combination on
vertical equity grounds should be made with consideration of the
entire tax structure. Many of the smaller selective sales taxes and
fees that states impose are likely to be regressive in their inci-
dence. Thus, substantial reliance on an income tax would likely
make the overall state tax structure proportional to slightly pro-
gressive. By contrast, reliance on a sales tax to provide most state
revenues almost certainly will mean that the whole tax structure is
regressive. A slightly regressive to proportional tax structure can
be obtained by balancing sales and income taxes. Overall, Mus-
grave and Musgrave estimate that the existing state and local tax
structure is proportional,33 while Phares concludes the structure is
regressive to about ten thousand dollars income and roughly pro-
portional above that level.34
In a recent public opinion poll by the United States Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, those sampled were
asked to identify the most unfair tax. The federal income tax with
thirty-eight percent was chosen by the most respondents, followed
by the local property tax with twenty-four percent, the state sales
tax with sixteen percent, and the state income tax with ten per-
cent. 5 The percentage choosing the state income tax was one per-
centage point lower than the finding of a similar poll a decade ear-
lier. 6 These polls suggest that the state income tax is not as
unpopular as the other major taxes, but this lack of unpopularity
probably has more to do with levels of the tax and other features
than with the perceived equity of the tax.
33. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 257 (1984).
34. D. PHARES, WHO PAYS STATE AND LOCAL TAXEs? 90-91 (1980).




D. Administration and Compliance
The last set of issues concerns achieving a tax structure that is
administratively efficient and has low compliance costs. Adminis-
tration and compliance costs are a deadweight loss to the economy
since they are lost to the taxpayer and unavailable for public
spending. Thus, efficiency in the revenue structure is essential. Ad-
ministrative efficiency can be defined as collecting the taxes at the
lowest possible cost per dollar of revenues. Compliance efficiency
occurs when a tax is understandable and requires relatively little
effort on the part of the taxpayer to file. Again, the administration
and compliance implications of an income tax must be compared
with the alternative tax instrument that could be used, because
costs are involved in collecting all taxes. A brief discussion of the
implications from federal tax reform also is included here.
1. Administrative Efficiency
This Article is not the proper setting for an in-depth analysis
of the administrative issues raised by the income tax. A broad dis-
cussion of administration is available elsewhere.3 7
Relatively little information exists in the economics literature
on the costs of collecting taxes per dollar raised. In a recent survey
Stan Chervin of the Tennessee Department of Revenue found that
the income tax costs between 0.2 and 1.5 cents per dollar to collect
across the twenty-six states that responded.38 In a separate analy-
sis Chervin estimated that the Tennessee sales tax costs 0.8 cents
per dollar to collect.3 9 Data of this type is indicative of the low
collection costs for both the income and sales taxes. Further, the
results evidence that collection costs are similar for income and
sales taxes. States appear to lose between 1.0 percent and 2.5 per-
cent of their collections for both sales and income taxes because of
difficulties in enforcement.40
A number of options are available for state governments to
limit the administrative costs of collecting the income tax. First, a
state government can opt to have the federal government collect
the tax as a piggyback tax on the federal income tax.41 Second, if
37. See generally C. PENNIMAN, supra note 24.
38. Unpublished survey conducted by Stan Chervin, Tennessee Department of Reve-
nue, Nashville, Tennessee.
39. Unpublished working document by Stan Chervin, Tennessee Department of Reve-
nue, Nashville, Tennessee.
40. See C. PENNIMAN, supra note 24, at 268.
41. See generally Kurtz, Federal Collection of State Individual Income Taxes, 1977
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the state adopts a tax base that is similar to the federal govern-
ment's, IRS tapes can be purchased and used to provide much of
the data necessary to audit the returns.
To make a decision about whether an income tax, a sales tax,
or a combination of the two is desirable on administrative grounds
would require much more information than is generally available.
Such decisions must be based on judgments about the relationship
between administrative costs and collections. First, there are prob-
ably some economies of scale to collecting an individual tax,
whether sales or income, because of large fixed costs in administra-
tion; therefore, as higher rates produce higher collections, the tax
becomes less costly to administer per dollar of revenues. On the
other hand, it seems likely that at some point the costs of adminis-
tering a tax will rise with rates because the incentives to avoid the
tax rise with the rates. Thus, as sales tax rates rise, it becomes
more advantageous to cross state lines to avoid the tax, and greater
resources must be used to administer the tax. Similarly, incentives
to avoid income taxes will increase as the rates rise.
An overall judgment is that it would cost more to administer
both a sales and an income tax than to administer just one, but
probably not significantly more as a share of revenues. Multiple
tax bases will, however, reduce the incentives to cheat or avoid the
taxes.
2. Compliance Costs
Compliance costs arise when taxpayers file tax returns and
make payments. Income taxes impose compliance costs on employ-
ers when withholding is used and on taxpayers when tax forms are
filed. The costs may consist of out-of-pocket expenditures or op-
portunity costs in terms of time. Compliance costs for an income
tax probably are greater than for a sales tax because more people
must file returns. The compliance costs, however, can be reduced
substantially if a state adopts simple forms that are based on in-
formation already prepared as part of the taxpayer's federal in-
come tax return. States often reduce sales tax compliance costs by
making a payment to vendors in proportion to tax collections. The
payment is compensation for the compliance costs. This payment,
however, only shifts the burden from the taxpayer to the state; it
does not eliminate the costs. Again, compliance costs appear
higher for a balanced tax structure using both income and sales
PROC. OF THE SEVENTIETH ANN. CONF. OF TAX'N 14.
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taxes than for a tax structure with only one major source.
3. Federal Tax Reform
A final topic to be considered is the effect that federal tax re-
form will have on the use of state income taxes. The impact de-
pends on the shape federal tax reform actually takes. One possibil-
ity is that state income taxes, but not sales taxes, will remain
deductible. This result would likely induce states to use income
taxes more intensely and sales taxes less so. Another possibility is
that no state taxes will remain deductible. Sales and income taxes
would still be the largest sources of state revenue with this scena-
rio. In this case, however, states would partially substitute fees and
charges on government services rendered for taxes on sales and in-
come. Also, in some states income taxes probably would be restruc-
tured to be less progressive. The reason this restructuring would
occur is that the main beneficiaries of the current deductibility are
higher income taxpayers who are paying the highest marginal rates
on state income taxes; thus, elimination of deductibility would
raise their taxes most, causing them to seek lower state rates.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no uniform tax structure that should be employed by
every state, nor is there an inviolate rule that says every state
should have an income tax. The tax structure for each state must
be set after consideration of the issues raised above and in light of
the economic characteristics, history, political climate, and demand
for government services that exists in the particular state. Still, it
is possible to reach some general conclusions about whether an in-
come tax is appropriate.
The previous section included a discussion of four broad issues
that are involved in the decision whether a personal income tax is
a desirable revenue raising instrument for a state. Revenue stabil-
ity and revenue adequacy were examined under the general topic
of meeting revenue needs. In the absence of an income tax, a state
probably will have both inadequate and unstable revenue flows,
making this a strong argument in favor of an income tax.
Keeping rates low is one way to minimize economic effects
from taxes. States can keep tax rates lower with a balanced struc-
ture than with a concentrated structure. This balanced structure
generally will limit the distorting effects of taxes on people's deci-
sions, on economic activity along the border, and on economic de-
velopment. States also should keep their tax structure (including
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revenue sources and rates) in line with neighboring states'. States
can reduce the distortions of economic behavior along state bor-
ders by using similar tax structures. Both of these arguments indi-
cate that an income tax usually is desirable.
Issues regarding the administration of and compliance with
taxes argue for a simple structure that relies on a relatively limited
number of tax instruments, each of which raises significant reve-
nues. Whether it would be less expensive to administer an income
tax, a sales tax, or a combination probably depends on the size of
each tax and on a number of other considerations such as how the
taxes are designed. In the case of a state tax system that is
designed to achieve efficient administration, there is no reason why
it should be significantly more expensive to administer both taxes.
Compliance costs also likely would be somewhat higher with a bal-
anced structure than with a concentrated structure.
Definitive statements cannot be made about whether an in-
come tax is desirable on equity grounds. Horizontal equity
problems arise with both sales and income taxes, and defending
either as being strongly preferable would be difficult. Vertical eq-
uity differences are clear: the sales tax is regressive and the income
tax is proportional to progressive. There is, however, nothing in-
herently preferable about either progressive, proportional, or re-
gressive taxation. The choice is one of value judgments.
Overall, the income tax as one part of the tax structure is de-
sirable on the basis of economic effects and revenue needs. The
arguments are relatively neutral on the basis of administration and
compliance. Whether an income tax improves or harms tax equity
must be judged independently according to each person's values.
In my estimation, the first two reasons are sufficient justification
for having an income tax as part of the tax structure. If residents
of the state prefer a regressive tax structure on equity grounds, it
is possible to design the combined income tax and sales tax struc-
ture to allow the system to remain regressive.
The choice of the particular characteristics of the income tax
depends on the state. A state with high demands for public ser-
vices will need higher rates and a more progressive pattern of
rates. States that desire more progressivity in the structure also
will want progressive rates. In states with different preferences, flat
and lower income tax rates may be preferable with more concen-
tration within the tax system on the sales tax. For all states the
income definition for taxation should be as close to the federal def-
inition as is acceptable to ease administration and compliance.
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